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Abstract 
In this paper I analyze the classes of price-paths arising from a non-Ricardian fiscal-monetary 
plan along the lines of the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level (FTPL), under a price-invariant 
nominal money supply rule in a standard Sidrauski-Brock model. I first show that fiscalist 
speculative deflationary paths are irrational bubbles. Then I argue that a fully autonomous 
fiscal policy is, in most cases, no implementable, regardless of the time-horizon, thus 
complementing Buiter's (2001, 2002) findings. Finally, I claim that, contrary to the FTPL's 
arguments, a speculative hyperinflation can never be a necessary result. This latter 
observation is taken as an evidence against the analogy drawn between the equilibrium 
value of a firm's stock and money, as recently suggested by some proponents of this new 
paradigm in monetary economics. 
Keywords: Fiscal-monetary interactions, Fiscal Theory of the Price Level, explosive 
pricepaths, transversality conditions. 
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1 Introduction
The existence of multiple money-price equilibria is a well known result in many economic
models and the issue has attracted much attention from economists. But, like many other
basic aspects in monetary economics, the question of what are the “fundamental” determi-
nants of the equilibrium value of money remains open. Firstly, modern government-issued
money, being an intrinsically useless object, posses an important modeling problem: what
is the role to be given to such an intrinsically useless asset? Although trying to give an
answer to this question goes well beyond the aim of this paper, it is still useful in order to
identify a first candidate to be an important determinant of the real value of money: the
role played by money in the economy. Secondly, as pointed out by Sargent and Wallace
(1981), since the monopolistic production of money may have effects on the balance-sheet
of the issuer institution (in this paper, the government), public finance considerations
seem to be another important candidate: the quantity of money and/or its value may be
affected by fiscal factors.
In this paper I deal with two theoretical paradigms that share a common goal: combine
the two broad sets of “determinants” given above so as to give an answer to the same
question, i.e. where does the value of money come from? Apart from this common
concern, everything else is conflicting in the two theories considered here: the traditional
monetarist approach à la Sargent-Wallace and the recently developed Fiscal Theory of
the Price Level1 (FTPL, henceforth).
The monetarist paradigm is consistent with the following interpretation of the two
determinants outlined above. The equilibrium price sequence depends positively on the
sequence of money supplies. Of course, the equilibrium price level will also depend on
the role played by money, i.e. it is also determined by those factors shaping the demand
for money. Regarding the influence of fiscal variables, Sargent and Wallace argue that
government deficits and debt are relevant for the price level as long as the government
accommodates its monetary stance to meet some fiscal targets via seigniorage. With re-
spect to the role of money in the economy, the degree of consensus within this paradigm
is rather low. Still, many monetary models, different in their views about the underlying
demand for money, allow for a familiar monetarist result: when money is perceived by
private individuals to be a purely fiat asset (i.e. non-convertible into intrinsically valu-
able goods or assets given by the government), speculative hyperinflationary paths along
which the demand for real balances vanishes cannot be eliminated2. Also, the standard
1Some of the seminal contributions on this new paradigm are contained in Leeper (1991), Sims (1994)
and Woodford (1994, 1995). Since then, a growing number of papers have further developed this theory
(see e.g. Bassetto (2002), Cochrane (1998, 2001, 2005), Daniel (2004), Davig and Leeper (2004), Gordon
and Leeper (2002), Leeper and Nason (2005), Leeper and Yun (2005), Sims (1999, 2002) and Woodford
(1998, 2001).
2This result holds for models with money in the utility function (e.g. Obstfeld and Rogoff (1983)),
overlapping generations models (e.g. Sargent and Wallace (1981)), random-matching models (e.g. Kiy-
otaki and Wright (1989)) and models in which money is explicitly modeled as the most liquid asset (e.g.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 9 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0533 
Kiyotaki and Moore (2001)).
monetarist wisdom dictates that price-paths along which the demand for real balances
grows without limit in a deflationary speculative fashion can be ruled out on the basis of
individual optimality (see, e.g. Brock (1974, 1975) and Obstfeld and Rogoff (1983)).
The FTPL’s view on the above particular issues is, basically, the opposite to the mone-
tarist one. According to the FTPL, the price level is, fundamentally, a fiscal phenomenon.
Fiscal variables like government surpluses/deficits, government debt (and its denomina-
tion, real or nominal) are thought to be the main determinants of the price level. Money
supply and demand play a very marginal role. Indeed, money may be dropped from the
economy, and the FTPL would still be able to say what the price level is, as long as the
private sector holds some initial financial wealth denominated in dollars and some general
sign conditions hold3. The fiscal-monetary policy-coordination highlighted by Sargent
and Wallace is not longer present in a fiscalist world. Fiscal and monetary policies can
be designed and implemented in a fully uncoordinated fashion, implying, among other
things, that an independent central bank does not longer guarantee inflation stability.
Further, this theory is consistent with a rather counterintuitive result: the government,
through a particular fiscal policy, may unchain an explosive deflation or hyperinflation,
even in the stark example in which money supply is thought to remain constant at every
future date. Thus, the FTPL is not simply consistent with the general view that the
actions of one agent (the government) can induce changes in the optimal actions of other
agents (households), but also is consistent with, e.g., the idea that government can act in
a particular way that necessarily results in the private agents losing their “faith” in fiat
money (i.e. causing a speculative hyperinflation).
A central objective of this paper is to shed some light on the current debate on
the consistency of the fundamental postulates of the fiscal theory, confining the analysis
to monetary rules based on a discretionary choice of the sequence of money supplies
by the central banker, in which the term discretionary is referred to a monetary plan
which is designed and executed in an autonomous way, i.e. free of any form of direct
fiscal dominance and independently from the state of the economy. This is a natural
terrain to study divergent price-paths, along which the price level explodes or implodes
as time passes without a parallel change in the stock of money. Also, such a class of
monetary rules has attracted much attention in the previous papers that analyze the
internal consistency and/or the empirical plausibility of this theory. Yet the level of
consensus within this branch of the literature is rather low. In a series of influential
articles, Buiter (1999, 2001, 2002) argues that in a standard Sidrauski-Brock model with
a finite number of periods, a monetary rule based on a discretionary choice of the sequence
of money supplies coupled with a fully autonomous fiscal plan, as the ones considered by
the FTPL, is likely to result in an over-determined system with more equations than
unknowns. This is, to the best of my knowledge, one of the most clear-cut criticisms
3The cash-less limiting case has been studied by Bassetto (2002) and Weil (2002), among others.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 10 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0533 
of the fiscal theory, for it is based on an uncontroversial simple mathematical result.
However, Buiter argues that such an over-determinacy problem vanishes as one considers
an infinite horizon economy, thus implicitly admitting the feasibility of fiscally-driven
divergent price-paths. A central theme of the paper is to show that Buiter’s arguments
for the finite horizon case necessarily extend to the infinite horizon framework. This result
is interesting on several grounds. First, because it naturally adds to the consistency of
the current analysis of the fiscal theory. Second, because many macro-monetary models
are cast within the infinite-horizon framework. The output obtained here regarding this
question can be posed in plain words as follows: totally uncoordinated fiscal-monetary
plans, as those considered by Buiter, result in a problem of over-determination of the
price level, regardless of the economy’s time-horizon.
The above observation pertains to the (in-)equilibrium prescriptions of this theory and,
as such, should not be much controversial. I then turn the view to the off-equilibrium
arguments exploited by the FTPL to justify the possibility of a fiscalist hyperinflation.
An interesting insight arises from the analysis of this extreme possibility. Treating the
government intertemporal budget constraint as a money-valuation-equation, as advocated
by the FTPL’s proponents, rather than as an identity, is not sufficient to sustain the
FTPL’s arguments. If one thinks of an economy in which money could be positively
valued by private individuals even when it is publicly known that money will never be
turned into intrinsically valuable consumption goods by the government (and the economy
under study allows for such a possibility), then one cannot explain an equilibrium in which
money is valueless (i.e. the terminal situation along a hyperinflationary path) by drawing
an analogy between money and a private firm’s share, as advocated by some proponents of
the FTPL4. No matter how low is the present-value stream of fiscal surpluses (zero in the
limit), a zero value for money would never be a necessary unique result. A particular form
of the government default versus supersolvency asymmetry discussed in a companion paper
(Arce, 2005) applies here: the government can use its ability to raise taxes so as to avoid
a speculative hyperinflation (as shown by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1983)) by committing
to pay a price for money higher than that prevailing in the market, thus creating an
arbitrage opportunity, but the government cannot force a speculative hyperinflation by
“committing” to pay nothing for an asset (money) that, at the prevailing market-price,
could be positively valued by private agents.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, I develop a simple model that has
been widely used in the previous literature and discuss the main implications regarding
the equilibrium price-sequence determination under alternative monetarist and fiscalist
formulations. In section 3, I show that fiscalist speculative deflationary price-paths can
not be part of an equilibrium. In section 4, I first argue that a non-Ricardian plan
involving a complete lack of fiscal and monetary coordination causes a problem of price
4For a recent exposition of this argument, see e.g. Cochrane (2005). 
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over-determination, regardless of the time-horizon of the economy. I then discuss the
fiscalist arguments concerning the occurrence of a divergent hyperinflationary path as a
unique equilibrium outcome. Section 5 contains a summary of the main conclusions.
2 Monetarist discipline vs Fiscalist laissez-faire
In this section, I first present a simple set-up to frame the arguments of the two para-
digms at stake, the monetarist and the fiscalist. The model developed below contains a
continuum of identical households and the government. Each household tries to maximize
its total discounted utility in a Walrasian competitive environment and the government
collects taxes, issues and purchases debt, consumes some real goods and prints money.
Time is discrete, there is no uncertainty and households are assumed to form their expec-
tations rationally. Then, I introduce the definition of alternative policies, according to the
fiscalist Ricardian versus non-Ricardian distinction and, using some particular examples
of these two broad classes of policies, I characterize the Walrasian competitive equilibria
arising under each policy specification. The general aim here is to provide a general pic-
ture of the implications of several Ricardian and non-Ricardian fiscal-monetary programs
for the determination of the equilibrium price sequence as they are usually presented in
the previous literature5.
2.1 A simple model
In most of the cases analyzed in this paper, I study price-level determination using an
infinite-horizon economy6. The representative household is assumed to enjoy utility from
consuming real goods and holding real balances and tries to maximize the following ob-
jective function7
max
{c,M}
∞X
t=1
βt−1
"
1
1− θc
1−θ
t +
1
1− θ
µ
Mt
Pt
¶1−θ#
(1)
where ct represents the household’s consumption, and MtPt corresponds to real money
holdings, i.e., nominal balances,Mt, deflated by the general price level, Pt. The parameter
β ∈ (0, 1) is the subjective discount factor. The parameter θ is strictly positive. As θ
approaches unity, the felicity function converges to the natural-logarithmic form. The
5The examples presented below closely follow those contained in Sargent and Wallace (1981), for
Ricardian policies, and in Woodford (1995), for the non-Ricardian fiscal-monetary mix.
6 In section 4, I use a one-period version of this general model to facilitate the comparison with Buiter’s
results.
7The choice of this particular utility function is made for simplicity. To my knowledge, most of the
previous papers about the FTPL in which real balances enter as an argument in the utility function assume
consumption-money separability. Consideration of an isoelastic utility function adds to the simplicity of
some mathematical derivations and allows for different classes of equilibrium price-paths just by assuming
different values for the parameter θ, as discussed later.
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household’s flow of funds budget constraints are given by
bt +
Bt +Mt
Pt
≤ y − τ − ct + (1 + rt−1) bt−1 +
(1 + it−1)Bt−1 +Mt−1
Pt
(t ≥ 1) (2)
where y > 0 is the exogenous household’s endowment of consumption goods, τ is a real-
denominated lump-sum tax collected by the government8; bt and Bt are the amount of
bonds denominated in real and monetary terms, respectively, demanded/supplied by the
household at the beginning of period t. Bonds are assumed to mature one period after
issued. Each real-denominated bond issued at t − 1 is redeemed at a value equivalent
to 1 + rt−1 consumption goods at t. Each dollar-denominated bond issued at t − 1 is
redeemed at a value equivalent to 1 + it−1 dollars at t. Households are also endowed
with some financial wealth at the beginning of the first period (t = 1), that may include
government bonds, inclusive of interest, (1 + i0)B0 and (1 + r0) b0, and money balances,
M0. The face-value of this initial financial wealth is given exogenously and assumed to
be strictly positive. Households are also constrained by the following no-Ponzi games
condition9
lim
T→∞
µ
bT +
BT +MT
PT
¶
/
T−1Q
j=1
(1 + rj) ≥ 0 (3)
Combining (2) and (3), we learn that the household’s intertemporal budget constraint at
any period t ≥ 1 is given by
(1 + rt−1) bt−1 +
(1 + it−1)Bt−1 +Mt−1
Pt
+
∞X
j=0
y − τQj−1
s=0 (1 + rt+s)
≥
∞X
j=0
ct+j +
it+j
1+it+j
Mt+j
Pt+jQj−1
s=0 (1 + rt+s)
(4)
When the household behaves optimally, equations (2), (3) and (4) all hold as equalities.
The remaining necessary conditions of the maximization problem faced by the represen-
tative household are
c−θt − λt = 0 (5a)
m−θt − λt
Pt
+ β
λt+1
Pt+1
= 0 (5b)
−λt
Pt
+ β
(1 + it)λt+1
Pt+1
= 0 (5c)
−λt + β (1 + rt)λt+1 = 0 (5d)
8For notational simplicity, both y and τ are assumed to be constant through time. The same assumption
applies later for government consumption, g.
9This form for the no-Ponzi games condition, in which the present value of the aggregate long-run
private financial wealth is required to be non-negative can be found, e.g. in Benhabib et al. (2002), Buiter
(1999, 2001, 2002), Buiter and Sibert (2004), Canzoneri et al. (2001), Daniel (2004), Woodford (1995,
2001, 2003). By contrast, McCallum (2001, 2003) argues in favor of a separate non-negative limiting
condition for each of the assets involved considered individually. I analyze the implications of these two
different constraints in section 3.
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where the λ’s are the familiar Lagrangian multipliers and mt ≡ MtPt .
The fiscal branch of the government sets the level of taxes and government consump-
tion and manages the public debt, issuing, purchasing and redeeming bonds. The central
bank chooses the sequence of money supplies independently of any other variable in the
economy. The policy mix is assumed to be consistent with the following general restric-
tions: Mst ≥ 0 and g < y, where g stands for government consumption. The consolidated
government’s flow of funds constraint is given by
bst +
Bst +M
s
t
Pt
= g − τ + (1 + rt−1) bst−1 +
Mst−1 + (1 + it−1)B
s
t−1
Pt
(t ≥ 1) (6)
where bst , B
s
t andM
s
t are, respectively, the government’s demand/supply of real-denominated
and nominal bonds and the supply of money during period t. Combining the sequence of
constraints in (6) with the following transversality condition
lim
T→∞
µ
bsT +
BsT +M
s
T
PT
¶
/
T−1Q
j=1
(1 + rj) = 0 (7)
gives the following government intertemporal constraint,
(1 + rt−1) bt−1 +
(1 + it−1)Bt−1 +Mt−1
Pt
=
∞X
j=0
τ − g + it+j1+it+j
Mst+j
Pt+jQj−1
s=0 (1 + rt+s)
(8)
2.2 Ricardian vs non-Ricardian
In this subsection I introduce a standard definition of Ricardian and non-Ricardian policies
and examine the implications of alternative fiscal-monetary programs for the equilibrium
of the model. In particular, I will assume that the policy announcements from both
economic authorities are taken as credible by the households, thus respecting the standard
Ricardian and non-Ricardian arguments. The following definition contains a standard
Ricardian versus non-Ricardian distinction10.
Definition 1 A government policy is Ricardian if it is formulated in such a way that the
transversality condition (7) is satisfied for any price sequence {Pt}∞t=1 . It is non-Ricardian
otherwise.
The definition of a Walrasian competitive equilibrium for this economy is given below.
Definition 2 A perfect foresight equilibrium in this economy is a set of allocations {ct} ,
{bt} , {Bt} , and {Mt} ,a set of positive prices and interest rates sequences {Pt} ,{rt} ,
{it} , and a government policy such that the following conditions are satisfied:
10See, e.g., Woodford (1995, 2001).
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1. Households maximize their utility subject to the constraints (2) and (3), the price
and interest rates sequences and the government policy.
2. The government satisfies its budget constraint (6) as an equality in every single
period and the transversality condition (7).
3. All markets clear in every period, i.e., y = ct + g, Mt = Mst , bt = b
s
t and Bt = B
s
t
for t ≥ 1.
A fiscal-dominance Ricardian regime Let’s consider a fiscal plan involving an ex-
ogenous sequence of constant primary deficits, τ − g < 0 for t ≥ 1. Also, let’s assume,
for simplicity, that all debt is real-denominated11. As the fiscal authority moves first, the
central banker must adjust its monetary policy so that the consolidated government in-
tertemporal budget constraint (8) holds for any feasible price sequence, i.e. the sequence
of seigniorage,
n
Mt−Mt−1
Pt
o∞
t=1
, adjusts endogenously. For example, if the monetary au-
thority tries to collect a constant level of seigniorage, s, money supply must obey the
following rule
Mt = Pts+Mt−1 (t ≥ 1) (9)
where s satisfies
s = g − τ + (1− β) (1 + r0) b0 (10)
Equation (10) is derived from the intertemporal constraint (8) and the individual opti-
mization and market clearing conditions. Of course, as long as there is an upper limit for
a constant level of seigniorage, say s∗, the fiscal authority is always limited in its choice
of the primary deficit by the following constraint
g − τ < s∗ − (1− β) (1 + r0) b0 (11)
Further, depending on the properties of the utility function, a non-price contingent se-
quence of primary deficits may not be sustainable at all. The following examples illustrate
this observation. First, if θ ≥ 112, the following condition holds as a strict inequality
lim
m→0
m
∂
h
1
1−θm
1−θ
i
∂m
≥ 0 (12)
In such a case we learn that there cannot be speculative hyperinflationary paths in equi-
librium13, so there is a unique equilibrium price sequence. It follows that a policy of
constant seigniorage and primary deficits satisfying (10) and (11) is feasible, in the sense
that, in equilibrium, the government always meets its predetermined fiscal plans. For
11This set-up resembles the one considered by Sargent and Wallace (1981; Appendix B) in which all
government debt is indexed or real-denominated.
12The equality part is understood as θ& 1.
13See Obstfeld and Rogoff (1983). 
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example, in the limiting case in which θ approaches unity, so that the liquidity services
function is represented in logarithmic form, the initial equilibrium price level satisfies
M0
P1
= − (1 + r0) b0 +
τ − g + c
1− β (13)
The rest of the elements of the equilibrium price sequence can be solved uniquely com-
bining the first order conditions (5a), (5b) and (5d), the market clearing conditions and
the money supply rule (9).
Second, if θ < 1, condition (12) holds as an equality and, hence, speculative hyperinfla-
tionary paths along which the demand for real balances falls towards zero cannot be ruled
out, unless the government commits to implement a price-contingent money-convertibility
plan, as described by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1983) and Nicolini (1996). It follows, that in
the absence of such a contingent convertibility plan, the commitment to run an exogenous
sequence of primary surpluses may not be credible14. But even if paths with real balances
disappearing are not observed in equilibrium, a feasible exogenous fiscal policy does not
guarantee price uniqueness, as the same constant level of seigniorage may be collected for
different inflation and price paths along a hump-shaped inflation-tax Laffer curve15.
A monetary-dominance Ricardian regime Let’s now consider the opposite regime
in Sargent and Wallace’s “game of chicken”, in which the monetary authority moves
first, announcing a constant exogenous growth rate for the nominal stock of money, i.e.
Mt = (1 + µ)Mt−1, with µ > 0 and the initial condition M0 > 0 taken as given. As in
the fiscal-dominance regime above, if condition (12) holds as a strict inequality there is
a unique equilibrium price sequence which can be solved by combining the money and
consumption-goods market clearing conditions and the first order condition (5b). In this
case, the only fiscal variable that affects the equilibrium price-sequence is the level of
government expenditure since, in equilibrium, it determines the available resources for
private consumption and, hence, the demand for real balances. On the other hand, if
(12) is satisfied as an equality then we cannot rule out multiple price sequences along
speculative hyperinflationary paths. In either case the fiscal authority must adjust the
sequence of primary surpluses so as to satisfy (8) as an identity.
Summarizing, under both Ricardian regimes the price level and the inflation rate are
purely “monetary” phenomena. Fiscal variables like debt and primary surpluses only
influence directly the price sequence if the central bank accommodates its policy so as to
collect a particular targeted level of seigniorage16. When condition (12) is satisfied as an
14This is just a reflection of the fact that, at some point(s) in time, it may not be possible to extract
any seigniorage from pure fiat money, for in that case, there may be equilibria along which the demand
for real balances drops to zero.
15Both kinds of speculative inflation paths, with and without a sustainable constant level of seigniorage,
are analyzed by Sargent and Wallace (1981, 1987).
16As noticed above, strictly speaking, government consumption influences the equilibrium price sequence 
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equality, the most intuitive case according to Obstfeld and Rogoff (1983), the stronger
version of the “game of chicken”, according to which one of the economic authorities
moves first, fixing exogenously its policy instruments, yields some “unpleasant” results.
Under a monetary-dominance regime, nothing precludes a multiplicity of equilibrium price
paths. Also, a fiscal-dominance regime may not be implementable unless there is a clear
commitment from both fiscal and monetary authority to alter their original plans so as
to implement a price-contingent money-convertibility plan. Overall, one of the central
messages arising from the two policies analyzed here is that a certain degree of fiscal and
monetary coordination is always needed, as dictated by the government intertemporal
budget constrain (8).
A non-Ricardian regime Here I describe the FTPL’s arguments concerning price
level determination using the simplest class of non-Ricardian policies, namely, policies
characterized by a complete lack of fiscal and monetary coordination along which both
authorities set their policy instruments without any feedback from the observed price
level17. Let’s assume that the central bank announces an exogenous sequence of money
supplies, {Mt}∞t=1. First, let’s suppose that the fiscal authority targets an exogenous
sequence of constant primary surpluses/deficits. Then, the FTPL suggests that the en-
tire equilibrium price-sequence can be solved from the government intertemporal budget
constraint (8), which must be respected in equilibrium. Whether the price sequence con-
structed in this way is unique or not depends on the properties of the utility function.
Specifically, the sign of the relationship between the inflation-tax terms on the right hand
side of (8), it+j1+it+j
Mst+j
Pt+j
, and the inflation rate, Pt+j+1Pt+j , depends on the value of the para-
meter θ according to the following condition18
∂
³
it+j
1+it+j
Mst+j
Pt+j
´
∂ Pt+j+1Pt+j
> 0 (= 0) [< 0] if θ > 1 (& 1) [< 1]
Let’s define Ωt as the time-t discounted value of the current and future inflation-tax terms,
i.e.
Ωt ≡
∞X
j=0
it+j
1+it+j
Mst+j
Pt+jQj−1
s=0 (1 + rt+s)
through its effect on private consumption.
17This generic class of non-Ricardian fiscal-monetary programs, in which both economic authorities set
their policy instruments without any feedback from the price level, has been considered by a large number
of authors, both defendants and opponents of the FTPL (see e.g. Buiter (1999, 2001, 2002), Cochrane
(2005), Evans and Honkapohja (2004), Woodford (1995, 1998, 2001)).
18This condition is derived under the assumption that the corresponding individual first order conditions
are satisfied. 
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It can be readily verified that the following sign condition holds
sign
½
∂Ω1
∂P1
¾
= sign
⎧
⎨
⎩
∂
³
it+j
1+it+j
Mst+j
Pt+j
´
∂ Pt+j+1Pt+j
⎫
⎬
⎭
Then, provided θ ≥ 1, we learn that if there is a price level P1 that satisfies the intertem-
poral budget constraint (8), then it must be the unique one satisfying that condition. Of
course, for such a price level to be part of an equilibrium, the following sign condition
must hold19
− (1 + rt−1) bt−1 +
∞X
j=0
τ t+j − gt+j + it+j1+it+j
Mst+j
Pt+jQj−1
s=0 (1 + rt+s)
> 0 (14)
The case in which θ < 1 requires a separate argument. As in this case both sides of
(8) are decreasing in P1, we cannot get a clean single-crossing result as before, as there
may potentially be several initial price levels (and inflation sequences) compatible with
that constraint. Generally, a similar argument applies to any utility function that yields a
hump-shaped inflation-tax Laffer curve. In view of this potential multiplicity of equilibria,
Woodford (1995) proposes the following tax policy
τ = τ − it
1 + it
Mt
Pt
(15)
where τ is set exogenously. Such a tax policy implies that the right hand side of the
budget constraint (8) does not contain any price-dependent variable, i.e.,
(1 + rt−1) bt−1 +
(1 + it−1)Bt−1 +Mt−1
Pt
=
∞X
j=0
τ − gQj−1
s=0 (1 + rt+s)
(16)
It follows that, as long as a sign condition similar to (14) holds, there is unique price
level, P1, such that (16) is satisfied. The characterization of the entire price-sequence
constructed in that way is then straightforward. Once P1 is uniquely determined, the net
supply of government bonds can be computed uniquely from the flow of funds constraint
(6), with the composition of the total end-of-period stock of debt being autonomously fixed
by the issuing agent. Then, we can solve for a unique P2 following the same argument as
before, i.e. by computing (16) one period forward, and, in this fashion, the unique price
sequence consistent with the foregoing fiscal-monetary non-Ricardian plan.
Thus, according to the FTPL, a fully uncoordinated fiscal-monetary plan like the
one just presented works de facto as an equilibrium selection device, as pointed out by
Kocherlakota and Phelan (1999). It is worth noticing that the unique fiscalist price
path need not to coincide with the fundamental monetarist one, in the sense that, even
in face of a constant money supply policy, the fiscal decisions may well unchain either
19Recall the assumption that the dollar-denominated household’s initial financial wealth (i.e. dollars
and nominal bonds inherited from period 0) is strictly positive.
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a hyperinflation or a deflation. These issues, i.e. the degrees of freedom of the fiscal
authority to implement a policy which is only consistent with a particular divergent
hyperinflationary or deflationary path, and some potential “anomalies” implicit in the
construction of the fiscalist price-sequence just described are analyzed in the following
sections.
3 Fiscalist speculative deflations: An issue of rationality
Woodford (1995) argues that the only requirement to be imposed on the evolution of
the stock of total financial wealth is the transversality condition (7), thus admitting the
possibility that the total discounted value of each of the three terms in that condition
(real balances and debt, nominal and real) differs from zero. That is, according to that
argument the following constraint is not strictly necessary for equilibrium
lim
T→∞
bsT
T−1Q
j=1
(1 + rj)
= lim
T→∞
BsT/PT
T−1Q
j=1
(1 + rj)
= lim
T→∞
MsT/PT
T−1Q
j=1
(1 + rj)
= 0 (17)
All that matters regarding the individual optimization problem is that the present value of
the long-run aggregate financial wealth, i.e. the sum of the three terms above, converges
to zero: “Equilibria of the kind constructed above will, for some specifications of the
monetary and fiscal sequences, imply explosive growth of real money balances to such an
extent that (17) is violated. These solutions [...] involve the supply of government debt
becoming negative - i.e., the government must become a net lender to the private sector.
[...] Because their monetary assets are offset by debt, households are not over-accumulating
wealth along such paths.” (Woodford (1995), equation numbering adapted20).
A similar environment (i.e., non-Ricardian exogenous sequences of money supplies
and primary surpluses/deficits in an infinite-horizon economy) has been studied by some
other authors analyzing the FTPL. Buiter (1999, 2001, 2002) provides a lucid proof
against the fiscalist arguments in a finite-horizon economy in which real balances enter as
an argument in the household’s utility function (to be discussed later in detail), however
he explicitly recognizes that a symmetric argument cannot be applied to an infinite-
horizon economy: “In the simple ‘money in the direct utility function’ model of this paper,
unbounded real balances do not violate the equilibrium conditions, because the nominal
interest rate would go to zero, creating an unbounded equilibrium demand for real balances
without consumption becoming unbounded.”. (Buiter (2001)). Marimón (2001) presents
a model inspired in a firm’s equity valuation problem, similar in most respects to the
one employed here. He analyzes fiscalist deflationary paths like the ones described by
Woodford in an infinite-horizon set-up. Some of the main conclusions in that article are
20A similar argument can be found in Woodford (2003).
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the following: “Nevertheless, the (fiscalist) determinacy result requires that proper present
value calculations are made by all agents. In our deterministic context this is already
difficult; in a stochastic context, [...] it may be close to impossible. [...] As existing
experimental evidence suggests, it is unlikely that all the equilibrium paths determined by
the fiscal theory will arise. This again, is an empirical matter [...]” (Parentheses added).
With respect to the above criticisms, here I take a further step, showing that specu-
lative deflationary paths associated with a violation of (17), in the sense described later,
can not be part of an equilibrium for this economy. For the sake of the clarity, I first
consider a non-monetary economy in which real bonds are the only available financial as-
set. Although such a scenario does not shed any light on the question of whether fiscalist
deflationary paths are possible equilibrium outcomes, it provides some useful insights on
the economic meaning of the transversality condition. Then, I introduce money along the
lines of the model discussed in the preceding section to show that a long-run accumulation
of real balances by the households inconsistent with (17) tantamounts to a violation of
an individual optimization condition. Without loss of generality, for the remaining of this
section it is assumed that the utility functions in (1) are logarithmic21. Also, to save on
notation, it is assumed that government consumption is zero (g = 0).
3.1 A cash-less economy
Let’s first think of an economy in which individuals maximize the following felicity func-
tion,
max
{c,M}
∞X
t=1
βt−1 log ct
subject to the sequence of flow of funds constraints
bt ≤ y − τ − ct + (1 + rt−1) bt−1 (t ≥ 1)
Thus, money is not traded at all. Consistently, nominal bonds, whose real value is linked to
money, are not transacted either. As before, households are assumed to hold some initial
financial wealth in the form of real-denominated bonds, inclusive of interest, maturing
at the beginning of period 1, (1 + r0) b0 > 0. As the stock of money and nominal bonds
are identically equal to zero at each date, the equivalent to the transversality condition
imposed previously, (3), would now read as follows
lim
T→∞
bT /
T−1Q
j=1
(1 + rj) ≥ 0 (18)
21This assumption simplifies computations, as the equilibrium inflation-tax Laffer curve is independent
of the inflation rate. Such an assumption is critical to rule out hyperinflationary paths, as discussed before,
but it is irrelevant with respect to deflationary paths analyzed here.
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For logarithmic utility function, the Euler equation takes the form
ct+1
ct
= β (1 + rt) (19)
The government budget constraint now becomes
bst = −τ + (1 + rt−1) bst−1 (t ≥ 1)
After imposing market clearing and individual optimization together with the no-Ponzi
games condition (18) holding as an equality, the existence of equilibrium for this economy
calls for a unique tax sequence for which, according to the assumption of constant tax
rate, each element (denoted by τM) satisfies the following condition
τM = (1− β) (1 + r0) b0 (20)
Although obvious, it is worth stressing the argument followed to label the tax rate satisfy-
ing (20) as the unique equilibrium one: implementation of any other (constant) tax policy
requires a departure from some fundamental features of the economy we are studying. For
example, a tax rate below τM , maintaining the assumption of zero g, could only be imple-
mented by, e.g., allowing the government to break its commitment to redeem the initial
stock of government bonds at its contractual value or to employ some coercive instruments
to force individuals to purchase bonds that pay a real return below its opportunity cost,
i.e. by violating (19). A special case of such a coercive action is that associated with the
transversality condition (18) holding as a strict inequality, for in that case the households
would be forced to accumulate government bonds whose present redemption value is zero.
Likewise, a tax rate above τM would require the payment of a supersolvency premium
on the initial stock of bonds or the commitment by the government to borrow (lend) at
a real rate above (below) the one consistent with the Euler equation (19). An example
of such a fiscal strategy can be constructed by allowing the government to accumulate
bonds issued by the households in an amount that violates the transversality condition
(18). To see this, let’s assume that the government implements a tax rate τH , such that
τH > τM . Under this policy the government intertemporal budget constraint becomes
(1 + r0) b0 =
τH
1− β + limT→∞β
T−1bT (21)
with limT→∞ βT−1bT < 0. One readily recognizes that such a long-run accumulation of
bonds plays the role of a mechanism to distribute resources from an otherwise supersolvent
government to the private sector. Thus, the purchase of those bonds tantamounts to an
outright transfer (equivalent to a reduction in the tax rate22 from τH to τM), and not to
22 Indeed, the government’s purchase of those bonds would require a direct individually-based form of
allocation, e.g. rationing, very much as a tax reduction.
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a process of accumulation of wealth, for, indeed, the government is never going to recover
those resources transferred in this way. In such a scenario, one could even argue that the
last term in (21) does not represent a stock of properly defined bonds, since the buyer is
expecting a future zero payoff from that financial investment.
In sum, implementation of a tax policy different from the one for which the transver-
sality condition (18) is not satisfied requires the incorporation of some strange elements
into the definition of equilibrium for the canonical economy described here, like the abil-
ity of the government to sell bonds whose return is not in line with the marginal rate
of substitution, as dictated by the first order condition (19), or to violate the limiting
condition (18) in order to transfer resources to the private sector by purchasing “bonds”
that are never going to be redeemed (henceforth, non-performing bonds).
3.2 Introducing money
Now I return to the general model with money described in the preceding section. To
facilitate the comparison with the cash-less economy analyzed above, I maintain the same
assumptions, i.e. logarithmic utility functions, time-invariant sequences of taxes and zero
government expenditure. The numerical values of y, (1 + r0) b0 and β are thought to be
the same as in the cash-less example. For the sake of the clarity, I first focus on a simple
monetary rule along which the central bank keeps the stock of money constant at its initial
value, i.e. Mt =M0 > 0, t ≥ 1. As the aim here is to study the implications of a positive
present-value of the long-run stock of real balances held by the households coupled with
an equivalent accumulation of bonds by the government, and the denomination of those
bonds is insubstantial for this issue, I focus on the simplest case in which the amount of
nominal debt is negligible.
With the foregoing set of assumptions, the relevant equilibrium intertemporal govern-
ment constraint computed at the initial period is
M0
PF1
+ (1 + r0) b0 =
τ + y
1− β (22)
For the fiscalist price, PF1 , to be well defined, the sequence of primary surpluses must be
consistent with the following sign condition (similar to (14))
τ + y
1− β − (1 + r0) b0 ≥ 0
Given the specification for the sequence of government consumption and the constant
money supply rule, we learn that the fundamental monetarist equilibrium price level, i.e.
the price that satisfies the first order condition (5b) and is consistent with the transver-
BANCO DE ESPAÑA    22 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0533 
sality condition (17), call it P f , is constant. Its value is given by
P f = (1− β)M0
y
(23)
As the stock of money is constant, seigniorage is identically equal to zero, so money
is neutral from a fiscal perspective. Then, it can be readily verified that the unique
equilibrium tax sequence consistent with that monetarist solution is τM , given above by
(20).
In order to obtain a fiscalist deflationary price sequence consistent with (3) holding
as an equality and with a simultaneous violation of (17), the tax sequence, denoting each
element by τH as in the previous subsection, must satisfy the following (equivalent) sign
conditions
τH
1− β > (1 + r0) b0
τH > τM
When these inequalities hold, the following inequalities are also satisfied
PF1 < (1− β)
M0
y
≡ P f
PFt+1 < P
F
t (t ≥ 1)
where PFt refers to the elements of the price sequence for which (5b) is satisfied at every
period, given the market clearing conditions. Then, the terms in (17), by construction,
satisfy
− lim
T→∞
bT
T−1Q
j=1
(1 + rj)
= lim
T→∞
MsT/PT
T−1Q
j=1
(1 + rj)
= − (1 + r0) b0 +
τH
1− β > 0
with (1 + rt) = β−1 (∀t ≥ 1) and limT→∞ β−1 PT+1PT = 0.
Thus, such a path is associated with a long-run accumulation of households’ bonds
by the government and, symmetrically, with a positive present-value stock of real bal-
ances in hands of the households, as described in Woodford’s passage. A natural question
arises: does this accumulation of bonds by the government hide an outright uncompen-
sated transfer of resources, as in the cash-less example, or, on the contrary, the parallel
accumulation of monetary wealth by the private sector is sufficient to compensate that
transfer? To see how the inclusion of money might change the picture described in the
cash-less economy, it is useful to rewrite the government intertemporal constraint (22) as
follows,
(1 + r0) b0 =
τH
1− β + limT→∞β
T−1bT (24)
BANCO DE ESPAÑA    23 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0533 
By comparing (21) and (24) we arrive at an uncontroversial result: adding money does
not change anything. The same anomalies described in the cash-less economy are present
here, i.e. the long-run stock of bonds accumulated by the government plays the role of a
pure uncompensated transfer to the private sector and, hence, considering those “bonds”
as “wealth” is a conceptual anomaly23.
Then, what is special in the fiscalist wealth-offsetting effect? In the limit (as t becomes
unboundedly large) we see individuals selling bonds to the government at a unit price of
one consumption good and accumulating real balances through a money revaluation-
process that, however, does not imply a symmetric flow of funds towards the government.
The last term in (24) represents resources flowing from the government to the households,
but a positive value of limT→∞ βT−1
MT
PT
does not represent any flow of resources from
the households to the government. At its core, this accounting misspecification is a
reflection of a flawed strategy based upon adding flow- and stock-variables together, which
is “solved” by introducing a new policy instrument (non-performing bonds)24.
The above accounting inconsistency extends to the fiscalist explanation of a defla-
tionary bubble in the price level. From the classical works by Brock (1974, 1975) and
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1983), we learned that individual optimal behavior calls for a zero
present-value for the long-run stock of real balances holdings, limT→∞ βT−1
MT
PT
, since a
strictly positive value tantamounts to the existence of an arbitrage opportunity: an indi-
vidual could increase its total utility by reducing its monetary holdings and increasing its
consumption. A direct implication of that argument is that, in equilibrium, the amount of
valuable resources that the private sector is willing to devote to maintain a positive stock
of real balances cannot be above that one consistent with the “monetarist-fundamental”
price P f defined in (23).
The FTPL is at odds with that argument, the reason being that the household’s
attempt to reduce her stock of real balances would cause an immediate default, through a
violation of its no-Ponzi games condition (3). However, from the above analysis, we know
that private default, i.e. the long-run accumulation by the government of non-performing
private bonds, is unavoidable given the fiscal commitment to a tax sequence like τH ,
and no change in the price level will correct it. In a sense, Woodford’s assertion that the
23The analysis here differs from the one carried out by Marimón (2001) in this important respect.
Marimón draws an analogy between the stock of money and the outstanding shares of a company, and
labels a non-Ricardian policy violating (17) as a policy of permanently undistributed profits, in that the
firm (i.e. the government) accumulates more profits (i.e. primary surpluses) than needed to redeem the
initial stock of debt. Here I am sticking to the same interpretation as in the cash-less example: the
extra “profits” are being distributed through the purchase of non-performing bonds, since, otherwise, the
sequence of flow of funds constraints would be violated.
24 In a recent paper Buiter and Sibert (2004) also justify the possibility of a deflationary bubble along
which (17) is violated. Although they do not refer to a non-Ricardian fiscal plan, the same accounting
anomaly as the one analyzed here applies in their environment: an unbounded accumulation of real
balances by the households does not offset an unbounded accumulation of (non-performing) bonds by the
government and, hence, along a deflationary bubble constructed in this way the private sector becomes
insolvent in the sense just described. A similar observation applies to some deflationary equilibria studied
by Benhabib et al. (2002, see e.g. their Section VI).
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households are not over-accumulating wealth is true, since the households, at the aggregate
level, are indeed insolvent, for those bonds sold in the long-run are never being redeemed.
Thus, if one really wishes to rule out private default as an equilibrium outcome, a necessary
first step is to impose the limiting condition limT→∞ βT−1bT = 0 (which clearly forces a
change in the tax plan). Once this condition is imposed, limT→∞ βT−1
MT
PT
= 0 appears as
an equilibrium condition driven by individual optimization and deflationary bubbles are
then eliminated. If, on the other hand, one is willing to assume the possibility of private
default in equilibrium (i.e. non-performing bonds being traded, the former equality is
not necessary for equilibrium, by assumption, but the latter will still bite, as long as the
household, by assumption, maximizes her utility.
Thus, regardless of whether the government behaves like a private optimizing agent,
by not purchasing non-performing bonds, or not, it is never optimal for the household to
over-accumulate real balances in this economy and, hence, deflationary bubbles consistent
with the violation of limT→∞ βT−1
MT
PT
= 0 can only be based on non-optimal private port-
folio choices. Offsetting a non-standard25 government fiscal plan with a non-optimizing
“equilibrium” individual behavior does not help much to understand the conditions under
which a deflationary bubble could take place and the role, if any, that fiscal policy might
play in unchaining it.
Extending the analysis to a money supply rule for which money is not fiscally neutral,
in the sense that seigniorage is not identically equal to zero at each date, will not alter
the main conclusion above. In this more general case, the government’s intertemporal
constraint becomes
(1 + r0) b0 =
τ
1− β +
∞X
t=1
βt−1
Mt −Mt−1
Pt
+ lim
T→∞
βT−1bT
As the last term in the right side is negative, the present-value of total net uncompensated
inflows of resources, i.e. taxes and seigniorage, exceeds the total standard net uncompen-
sated outflows, that is, the initial stock of bonds. The gap is covered by an uncompensated
outflow via purchases of no-performing bonds. But optimal individual choices still require
the fulfillment of the limiting condition limT→∞ βT−1
MT
PT
= 0.
4 Fiscalist non-deflationary paths: Not everything works
In this section I focus on fiscalist price paths along which the price level is not thought
to decrease monotonically over time as in the case analyzed in the previous section. This
general class of solutions includes both the fundamental monetarist solution and, possibly,
multiple speculative hyperinflationary paths. The latter class of price-paths in the context
25By non-standard, here I mean the explicit consideration of a non-standard asset or, more precisely, a
novel government-policy instrument (i.e. non-performing bonds).
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of a Sidrauski-Brock model similar to the one in this paper have been extensively analyzed
in the previous literature. Kocherlakota and Phelan (1999) consider a simple experiment
consisting in a one-time decrease in the money supply under both a Ricardian-monetarist
and a non-Ricardian-fiscalist policy: “The monetarist device predicts a one-time decrease
in the price level [...] the fiscal theory device predicts a speculative hyperinflation. Which
prediction seems more plausible? You decide.” Similarly, McCallum (2001) argues that
the standard (fundamental) monetarist price sequence “is arguably more plausible (than
a fiscalist hyperinflationary one) since it is the solution that is typically regarded as the
bubble-free ‘fundamentals’ solution.” (Parentheses added). McCallum (2003) also inves-
tigates the learnability of fiscalist hyperinflationary paths in a stochastic environment26:
“[...] the fiscalist hypothesis implies that, despite a constant money stock, the bond stock
and the price level both explode as time passes - but without violating any optimally con-
dition for private agents. [...] The crucial issue is, which of the two solutions provides
the better guide to reality, i.e., to price level behavior in actual economies? [...] it is
demonstrated that with the basic policy specification the traditional fundamentals solution
is E-stable and therefore learnable, whereas the fiscal-theory bubble solution is not.”
Thus, to the best of my knowledge, all the previous papers analyzing the FTPL under
an exogenous money supply rule in an infinite-horizon economy in which the velocity of
money-circulation depends on the nominal interest rate come to agree on the same general
point: fiscalist hyperinflationary paths are counterintuitive, implausible, unrealistic or not
learnable, yet theoretically consistent, in the sense that along such paths no necessary con-
dition for equilibrium is violated. Much on the contrary, in the finite-horizon counterpart
of the models studied by the authors mentioned above, Buiter contends that in the FTPL
“the initial price level is determined twice, once from the monetary equilibrium conditions
and once from the government’s intertemporal budget constraint. Except through a fluke,
these two values of the initial price level will not be the same.” (Buiter (2002; p. 474).
In plain words, this statement implies, that an arbitrary combination of fiscal and mon-
etary plans coupled with an exogenous initial stock of nominal-denominated assets leads
directly to an implementation problem: one of the two economic authorities must blink.
In the remaining I first describe Buiter’s argument in a simple one-period economy and
then show that the same implementation problem is also present in the infinite-horizon
version of the model. Finally, I analyze in some detail the FTPL’s arguments using an
extreme example of a fiscalist hyperinflation, devoting special attention to the role of
transversality conditions, the fiscalist stock-analogy and the controversy on the origin of
the initial stock of government liabilities.
26Evans and Honkapohja (2004) study fiscalist solutions along some learnibility criteria, as well.
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4.1 A finite-horizon economy: Buiter’s criticism
Let’s think of a simple one-period economy, as a special case of the infinite-horizon one
discussed so far. In such an economy, Buiter’s criticism holds: a fully uncoordinated
non-Ricardian fiscal-monetary plan is likely to be non-implementable. Let’s assume that
the representative household chooses the level of consumption, real money holdings and
bonds so as to maximize
1
1− θc
1−θ
1 +
1
1− θ
µ
M1
P1
¶1−θ
(25)
subject to the flow budget constraint
b1 +
B1 +M1
P1
≤ y − τ − c1 + (1 + r0) b0 +
(1 + i0)B0 +M0
P1
and the borrowing limit B1P1 + b1 ≥ 0. When optimizing, the household behaves according
to the following conditions
m−θ1 − c−θ1
Pt
= 0 (26)
c1 = y − τ + (1 + r0) b0 +
(1 + i0)B0 +M0
P1
− M1
P1
The government budget constraint is given by
bs1 +
Bs1 +M
s
1
P1
= g − τ + (1 + r0) b0 +
M0 + (1 + i0)B0
P1
After imposing B1P1 + b1 = 0 as an equilibrium requirement, the government’s constraint
reads as follows
M0 + (1 + i0)B0
P1
= − (1 + r0) b0 + τ − g +
Ms1
P1
Let’s assume that the central banker sets Ms1 and the fiscal authority chooses g, both
being fixed independently of the observed price level, P1. Then, given the market clearing
conditions c1 = y− g and M1 =Ms1 , we learn that there can be, at most, two alternative
equilibrium price levels:
P f1 =
M1
y1 − g
for any θ > 0 (27a)
Ph1 =∞ for any θ < 1 (27b)
Notice that when θ > 1, there is a unique equilibrium price level (the fundamental one
in (27a)), as in such a case (12) is satisfied as a strict inequality. But even if (12) holds
as an equality, we can characterize all the feasible equilibrium price-levels (two in this
case, the fundamental and the hyperinflationary one) regardless of the tax policy at work,
τ , and of the initial stock of financial wealth (i.e. independently of its magnitude and
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composition). It follows that the tax rate may take, at most, two possible values, τf and
τh, each associated with one of the two possible prices consistent with the market clearing
conditions and the optimality condition (26), P f1 and P
h
1 , respectively. These two feasible
values are given below
τf = g + (1 + r0) b0 +
M0 + (1 + i0)B0
P f1
− M
s
1
P f1
, for P1 = P
f
1
τh = g + (1 + r0) b0 for any θ < 1 for P1 =∞ (28)
Thus, any fiscal policy not in line with the above feasible tax rates, will result in an
over-determined system, so an uncoordinated fiscal policy, in the sense just described, is
not implementable.
4.2 An infinite-horizon economy
The above over-determinacy result should be uncontroversial. As pointed out by Buiter,
it is just a question of counting equations and unknowns. However, Buiter fails to extend
that argument to an infinite-horizon economy: “Proposition 5, that under a non-Ricardian
fiscal-financial-monetary programme with an exogenous rule for the nominal money stock
the general price level is over-determined, now (in the infinite horizon case) only applies
when the velocity of circulation of money does not depend on the nominal interest rate
and, through that, on expected future price levels.” (Buiter (2001), parentheses added).
Here I argue that a similar over-determination problem arises in a with infinite-horizon
model with real balances in the utility function, i.e. a model in which the velocity of
circulation does depend on the nominal interest rate. I distinguish two cases, as before:
θ ≥ 1 and θ < 1.
First, when θ ≥ 1, we know from (12) that speculative hyperinflationary paths are
not possible. Once the monetary authority has fixed the sequence of money supplies and
the fiscal branch has set the sequence of government consumption, there is a unique equi-
librium price sequence, as shown in the preceding section. For example, with logarithmic
utility functions, if the central bank sets an exogenous money supply in period 1,M1, and
commits to increase it at a constant rate µ from that period on, then a constant tax rate
sequence and the unique equilibrium price sequence must satisfy
τ =
"
1− β
1− β1+µ
(1 + i0)B0 +M0
M1
− 1
#
(y − g) + g + (1− β) (1 + r0) b0 (29a)
Pt =
µ
1− β
1 + µ
¶
(1 + µ)t−1M1
y − g , (t ≥ 1) (29b)
It is worth noticing that the equilibrium price sequence in (29b) is completely independent
of the tax policy and the initial stock of nominal financial wealth, (1 + r0) b0+(1 + i0)B0+
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M0. On the contrary, the equality in (29a) makes clear that the unique feasible tax policy
depends on the initial volume of government obligations and on the time-path of the
money supply and, hence, on the price sequence: a plain monetarist-Ricardian monetary-
dominance regime at work.
Second, if θ < 1, we know from the results discussed in section 3.2 that there are
multiple equilibrium price-paths, one fundamental and, in an infinite horizon economy,
an infinite number of speculative hyperinflationary paths consistent with the first order
conditions of the household’s optimization problem and the market clearing conditions.
This potential multiplicity of equilibrium price-paths might suggest that the tax policy
is not subject to a constraint like (29a). Here I argue that even when θ < 1, there are
not a continuum of equilibrium price-sequences, in the sense that between two consecu-
tive different feasible hyperinflationary price-sequences (to be defined later), there are a
continuum of non-equilibrium price-sequences.
The proof of the above claim (namely, that there are not a continuum of equilibrium
price-sequences) is based on a simple observation. From the one-period economy described
above, we learn that in a n-period economy there are n+ 1 (potential) equilibrium price
sequences, n speculative and one fundamental. Each of the n speculative prices-paths can
be labelled by its initial element, P j1 (j = 1, ..., n) , such that P
j
1 > P
j−1
1 > P
f
1 , where P
f
1
is the first element of the unique bubble-free equilibrium sequence. Let’s denote the set
containing the n (potential) hyperinflationary-equilibrium initial prices by Ψn. AsMt > 0,
there is a continuum of initial non-feasible, thus out-of-equilibrium price levels, PNE1 , not
belonging to Ψn and satisfying P
j
1 > P
NE
1 > P
j−1
1 . Hence, as the number of periods
increases by one, the number of feasible equilibrium price sequences increases by one, but
the number of non-feasible price sequences increases by a continuum (i.e. by an infinite
measure). Obviously, the argument goes on as we increase n without limit. It follows that
a tax sequence chosen arbitrarily need not to be implementable. Formally, let’s consider
the fiscalist solution discussed in section 3.2 with the added simplifying assumptions used
above, i.e. constant money supply (Mt = M0 for t ≥ 1) and constant and exogenous
government consumption. The equivalent to the government valuation equation (16) now
is given by27
(1 + i0)B0 +M0
P1
=
τ − g
1− β − (1 + r0) b0 (30)
In view of (30), the fiscalist proposition according to which “the path of the money supply
does not matter” is plainly justified: the sequence of money supplies {Mt}∞t=1 is completely
irrelevant for the determination of P1 and the price level is only affected by fiscal variables
(put aside M0, which need not to be strictly positive for the fiscalist argument as long as
B0 > 0). However, for an arbitrary τ , the price, P1, satisfying (30) need not to belong
27Recall that when θ < 1, solving for the initial price level using the government intertemporal budget
constraint may not give a unique solution. As pointed out before, a sufficient condition to preclude that
possibility is to impose a tax policy like the one in (15).
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to the set containing all P j1 , even after taking into account that this set may contain an
infinite number of elements. If we were to choose a particular τ randomly, the system
would be lead to a collapse of the price level with a probability 1.
Formally, if an arbitrary P1 is not the fundamental one P
f
1 , then it must satisfy P1 >
P f1 , so it would be associated with a speculative hyperinflationary path. We also know
that the last finite element of any sequence whose first element is in Ψn is uniquely given by
P ∗ = My−g . As P1 /∈ Ψn, the last finite and positive element of the price sequence satisfying
the individual optimization conditions and the market-clearing conditions associated with
P1, call it eP, must satisfy eP > P ∗. But then, the first order condition (5b) is violated, i.e.
it satisfies ³
M
?P
´−θ
−
¡
M
P∗
¢−θ
eP = −β (y − g)
−θeP+1 > 0 (31)
where eP+1 would be the next period (negative) price level.
Clearly, the tax sequence must satisfy a restriction similar to (29a), although here, as
the set of feasible prices contains an infinite number of elements, the set containing the
potential constant taxation levels (i.e. those tax policies involving a term τ that avoid
the over-determination problem in (31)) includes an infinite number of elements, as well.
Each of these elements must satisfy the following restriction
τf = (1− β)
"
(1 + i0)B0 +M0
P f1
+ (1 + r0) b0
#
+ g for P f1 (32a)
τ j = (1− β)
"
(1 + i0)B0 +M0
P j1
+ (1 + r0) b0
#
+ g for P j1 ∈ Ψn (32b)
It follows that, as P f1 and P
j
1 depend on the particular money-supply sequence {Mt}∞t=1,
so must depend the sequence of potential constant taxation levels, as well. And, as
before, in characterizing the set of feasible equilibrium price-sequences the information
on the initial stock of government liabilities is completely irrelevant. In this precise sense,
except through a fluke a fully uncoordinated non-Ricardian fiscal-monetary program will
not pass its preliminary test: consistency with the equilibrium conditions, among which,
a non-negative price level should be listed as a fundamental one.
4.3 Speculative hyperinflations: A necessary result?
The previous result poses an important obstacle for the fiscalist interpretation of the gov-
ernment budget intertemporal budget constraint (30) as a government valuation equation,
along which the equilibrium price of outstanding nominal-denominated assets is computed
as the price of a private firm’s equity, since, as just shown, an arbitrary stream of current
and future profits (i.e. government surpluses) coupled with an arbitrary initial stock of
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firm’s shares (i.e. initial nominal financial wealth, (1 + i0)B0 +M0) will, in most cases,
lead to a negative price for the firm’s equity as time passes. The extension of this cri-
tique to a stochastic environment, in which the sequence of fiscal surpluses and/or money
supplies are subject to purely exogenous random shocks is straightforward, as well.
Still one could argue that the restriction on the set of implementable tax sequences
contained in (32b) does not shed light on the question of which policy, monetary or fiscal,
has the last word in the mechanism of equilibrium-prices determination. For example,
the FTPL’s arguments would be consistent with the idea that, either through a fluke
or through a purposively fiscal-monetary coordinated mix, the government may unchain
a speculative hyperinflationary path, as suggested by Kocherlakota and Phelan (1999),
provided that individual preferences satisfy θ < 1 and the foregoing fiscal-monetary plan
is consistent with the implementation condition in (32b)28. Although this question, in
contrast to those analyzed up to this point, pertains to the off-equilibrium sphere, the
starkness of a fiscally-induced speculative hyperinflation provides a natural terrain in
which one can learn on the fundamental differences of the two paradigms in question.
The fact that an intrinsically useless asset, like modern government-supplied money,
may have a positive real value in equilibrium is not just a well-known result, but it is,
perhaps, the most distinctive feature of non-convertible money. However, as the real value
of money is only rooted on the private expectations about the value of that durable asset,
nothing precludes the possibility of a class of equilibria in which money does not have
any positive value. When the faith of the households in the current or future value of
money weakens, the current real value of money falls, perhaps, to zero. Such a possibility
is a natural result due to the nature of modern money, as long as government-issued
notes can be thought as of being an intrinsically useless asset. Moreover, this possible
outcome is a “healthy” result in any model of (non-convertible) purely fiat money. As
shown by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1983), in an economy identical in its basic aspects to the
one studied here, when private faith threatens to vanish, the government, by committing
to turn money into a claim for an intrinsically valuable good, may avoid a speculative
hyperinflation, adding the “missing doses of private faith” in money. But how can the
government purposively reduce the real value of money? According to the monetarist
wisdom, this can only be done by announcing a policy of increasing money supplies. But
this will result in a ‘fundamental’ hyperinflation and not necessarily in a speculative one,
that is, the real value of money need not drop to zero29. Thus, the asymmetry between
avoiding a speculative hyperinflation and unchaining it is clear: private faith in money
can be reinforced by the government, but the government cannot eliminate it. The FTPL
is at odds with this principle. The following simple example seeks to explain why.
28As just shown, both conditions are necessary along an equilibrium hyperinflationary path.
29Along a non-specualtive hyperinflation the price level remains finite as long as the present and future
money supplies remain finite as well.
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For simplicity, I consider a version of the simple one-period economy analyzed above30.
Let’s initially think of an economy without government in which the representative house-
hold begins her life with a positive (and finite) stock of an intrinsically useless asset, called
money and denoted by M , whose quantity can not be altered, so that the end-of-period
aggregate stock of money must coincide with the initial one. As before, the household
receives an endowment of consumption goods, y. These, consumption goods and money,
are the only good/assets transacted in this economy. Preferences are given by (25) and
θ < 1 holds. The household-j budget constraint is
M j
P
≤ y − cj + M
P
where M
j
P and c
j are, respectively, the household’s demand for real balances and consump-
tion goods. The characterization of the two alternative Walrasian competitive equilibria
is similar to the model with an active government discussed above. Given individual
preferences, we learn that in addition to the fundamental price, P f = My , there is another
equilibrium in which money is valueless. In either case, equilibrium requires cj = y and
Mj
P =
M
P .
Now, let’s introduce another agent into the picture, the government. This new agent
is special in that it has the exclusive right to tax individuals and to supply an asset
whose possession does not yield any utility to the households per se. Let’s refer to this
asset as a bond and denote its supply by d, its demand by household-j by dj and its
price, measured in units of consumption goods, by q. Suppose, that at the beginning of
the period, before any trade takes place, the government announces that it will make a
transfer to the private sector, which involves the delivery of consumption goods and/or
money, equivalent to the value of T monetary units. Thus, its constraint reads as follows
qb+ τ =
T
P
(33)
The Ricardian approach would be consistent with the following idea. The transversality
condition qb = 0 must hold always, for any vector of prices (P, q) . As the flow of funds
identity (33) must hold for any conceivable P , the government must raise resources from
the private sector to pay the transfer whenever the price is finite, like P f above and,
trivially, τ = 0 holds in the equilibrium in which money is valueless. The FTPL, on
the contrary, allows the government to ex-ante commit to a non-contingent zero tax. As
a fundamental piece in the fiscalist argument is that the government always honors its
commitments, it follows that the unique equilibrium calls for a zero value for money. Why
cannot P f be now part of an equilibrium? Because, according to the fiscalist dictum,
30This assumption is made for the clarity of the exposition. Nonetheless one may think of this economy
as the first period of a multi-period one, with finite or infinite horizon, in which the endowments of money
and consumption goods remain constant and the government commits to a zero primary surplus from
period 2 on, thus rolling over any stock of debt alive at the end of period 1.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA    32 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0533 
it would violate the government transversality condition and, with it, some individual
optimality and/or market clearing condition. Still, it can be argued that it is always
possible for the market for non-performing bonds to clear:
qb = q
X
j
bj = 0 (34)
That is, either both supply and demand are equal to zero or so it is the price level, q. This
simple argument applies regardless of the value of P. Accepting the possibility that (34)
may hold always and assuming that this is, indeed, the case tantamounts to impose the
Ricardian hypothesis, under which P f may well be an equilibrium outcome. Although
to understand the lack of generality of the FTPL’s arguments only the may part of the
previous statement is necessary. The following remarks aim at clarifying some critical
questions at this point.
i. Transversality conditions: identities or equilibrium conditions? Intertemporal gov-
ernment constraints or asset valuation equations? These questions are at the centre of
the current debate on the FTPL. For some authors, like Buiter, transversality constraints
must always hold, both at equilibrium and off-equilibrium prices. On the other hand, some
proponents of this theory have provided some arguments for treating them as equilibrium
conditions. Among those arguments, I find Cochrane’s (2005) ones specially appealing.
According to him, one should view government bonds and money as shares whose payoff
is given by the expected fiscal surpluses: “The government auctions new debt, and ac-
cepts whatever price results [...]” (italics as in original). Thus, a positive supply of bonds,
b > 0, cannot be ruled out a priori. In our simple economy, the households could auction
consumption goods and/or money in exchange for those bonds. Can we assume that in
some contingencies the households supply a positive amount of goods and/or money? Yes,
thus violating an optimality condition. The resulting price of a bond would not capture
the stream of surpluses backing those bonds, i.e. zero in this simple one-period econ-
omy31. That price wouldn’t be an equilibrium one. In this sense, it can be argued that
treating transversality conditions as identities seems a “too strong” assumption. In the
same way as the first order condition governing the optimal individual demand for money
(5b) may be seen as an asset valuation equation, which, somewhat tautologically, can be
violated at off-equilibrium money-prices, the government intertemporal budget may be
understood as a bond-valuation equation. But, can we assume that in some contingencies
the households do not supply any goods and/or money in exchange for bonds? Yes, such
an option is always feasible. In that case, the lending decision is the optimal one. The
real value of a bond then drops to zero, in line with the future government’s surpluses.
31The argument clearly applies in the same manner to an infinite horizon economy, where for a given
stream of future fiscal surpluses, determined independently from the price of a bond, and a given stock
of government bonds being auctioned, the equilibrium bond-price is unique. The fact that in a finite
horizon economy the equilibrium bond-price for bonds auctioned in the terminal period is zero only adds
a numerical detail.
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Then, no matter what P happens to be, the government must abandon its target for a
zero tax so as to satisfy τ = TP . Taking for granted that the government auctions new debt
whenever P is finite, which assumption captures better the household’s off-equilibrium
lending behavior? This is a religious issue. Can we establish any link between P and the
household’s lending decision? No. Independently of the particular value of P, a house-
hold’s strategy of a zero supply of goods and/or money in exchange for bonds is always
feasible and optimal. Thus, regardless of whether one views transversality conditions as
identities or as equilibrium conditions, there is always room for a Ricardian-like mecha-
nism to operate, which, tautologically, means that the FTPL’s non-Ricardian mechanism
need not to operate.
Concerning the above two questions, the Ricardian hypothesis, takes a rather con-
servative approach: we know how to describe in an unambiguous way what the unique
optimal lending decision is, but we do not have any guide to explain a non-optimal lending
decision as a function of the value of money, hence we assume that the lending decision is
the right one for any money-price. Such a hypothesis will not rule out equilibria in which
money is not positively valued. Yet, as stressed above, that possibility should always
arise in an economy in which money is a purely fiat asset. On the other hand, such a
hypothesis will rule out the idea that money cannot be positively valued in equilibrium
because, if that were the case, the households would feel an irrepressible temptation to
demand (useless) government bonds and/or the market for money and/or consumption
goods could not clear.
ii. Money as a private firm’s stock. In Arce (2005), it is argued that the fiscalist
stock-analogy can be interpreted as a useful tool to understand the limits of the FTPL as
a theory capable to challenge the traditional monetarist propositions on the equilibrium
value of fiat money. Here I take up the stock-analogy to argue that along a fiscalist
hyperinflation the mechanism of price determination has no resemblance to the standard
asset-valuation argument employed in solving for the equilibrium value of a firm’s stock.
The logic of this claim is simple. Following the fiscalist argument, let’s think of the
outstanding beginning-of-period stock of money and nominal bonds as residual claims
to the government’s fiscal surpluses. From the no-government case analyzed above, we
know that there is an equilibrium in which the initial stock of money still has a positive
value, simply because there is an underlying liquidity services function. This illustrates an
important difference between money and the share of a firm. The former may be positively
valued by the private sector even when its issuer commits to never redeem it in exchange
for any intrinsically valuable good or to pay any dividend on it. Then, if money is still
thought to be a “government share”, it must be recognized that it may well be traded at
a positive price even when the government is expected to make no profits. Then, how can
we justify a zero value for money as a necessary unique equilibrium outcome? Clearly,
not simply by arguing that the expected stream of profits backing the stock of money
is zero, for those profits were already zero in the no-government case (by construction)
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and there was an equilibrium at which money was positively valued32. In this sense, the
stock analogy does not provide a sufficient intellectual framework to justify a fiscalist
hyperinflation, this being a reflection of the fact that treating transversality conditions as
equilibrium conditions is not sufficient to justify the off-equilibrium link between money
prices, debt prices, market clearing and individual optimality implicit in the fiscalist
hypothesis.
iii. The initial stock of nominal assets. Where did it come from? Does it matter? The
FTPL regards the existence of an initial stock of nominal-denominated assets (i.e. money
and/or nominal bonds) as a necessary condition for a non-Ricardian fiscal-monetary to
yield equilibrium uniqueness. Niepelt (2004) forcefully argues against this hypothesis: if
individuals would had anticipated the future implementation of a non-Ricardian regime
at the time of purchasing the initial stock of government-issued assets (not explicitly
modeled), they wouldn’t have bought as much nominal assets in the first place. In view
of these reflections, he suggests that the non-Ricardian argument would work properly
if instead of assuming that there exists a positive stock of assets which were voluntarily
bought by the households in some past date, the government commits to make nominal
transfers and/or to levy taxes in a given nominal amount. The example constructed above
clearly fulfills Niepelt’s requirements to activate a fiscalist price-determination mechanism.
On the one hand, the initial stock of money is explicitly treated as an exogenously given
endowment. One may clearly understand this as the government dropping (i.e. giving for
free) that money evenly across households at the beginning of the history, before voluntary
trade takes place. On the other hand, we have just checked in the above example that
regarding T as a pure nominal-denominated transfer rather than as a bunch of maturing
government nominal bonds does not make any difference regarding the ability of the
government to “choose” a hyperinflationary path as a unique equilibrium. Something is
special in the FTPL, but it has no connection with the voluntary-trade versus coercive-
transfer distinction highlighted by Niepelt. By contrast, most of the analysis on the
special features of the FTPL carried out in the paragraphs above is focused on the role
of the transversality conditions. This seems a natural strategy after recognizing that the
Ricardian versus non-Ricardian distinction is, indeed, driven by an assumption about
transversality conditions (Definition 2), and only by that.
Summarizing, none of the arguments built up to support the validity of the FTPL
listed above provide a lucid explanation of the question we are after: how can the gov-
ernment implement a fiscal policy that necessarily results in private individuals loosing
their faith on money? Although such a possibility may be seen as a minor pitfall in this
theory, confined to a counterintuitive, although remote, theoretical possibility, it must be
32At this point one could argue that the government, apart from its monopolistic right to levy taxes,
may also change the stock of money, so that it could use the latter to always meet its commitment to
transfer T units of money to the private sector. This is true, the government may always finance a nominal-
denominated transfer by printing money, but such a strategy leads to a plain monetarist fiscal-dominance
regime similar to the one described in section 2.2.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA    35 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0533 
recognized that the core mechanism of this theory works always in the same manner, re-
gardless of whether the mechanism leads to the stark corner of a divergent hyperinflation
or to a seemingly appealing explanation of some observed facts, and independently of the
monetary rule at work (say, an interest rate peg or a nominal stock target).
5 Conclusions
In this paper, I dealt with a particular question raised in the recent debate on the validity
of the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level (FTPL): the feasibility of fiscal-driven divergent
price-paths in economies in which the monetary authority sets a nominal anchor by an-
nouncing an exogenous sequence of money supplies. In part, this question, as opposed
to those tackled in a companion (Arce (2005)), pertains to the behavior of the economic
variables in equilibrium, and, as such, should not be much controversial. Yet, for a the-
ory that seems to posses a special ability to attract confusion, the degree of consensus
on that question is still low. In a series of influential papers, Buiter (1999, 2001, 2002)
argues that uncoordinated monetary-fiscal programs as those proposed by the FTPL are
generally non-implementable in finite-horizon economies, for they involve a mathematical
over-determination problem. However, he denies the existence of that problem in infinite-
horizon models in which the demand for real balances depends upon expected inflation.
This observation has been overlooked in the subsequent work on the FTPL devoted to the
study of fiscalist deflationary or hyperinflationary paths. This piece of work is intended to
fill this gap, by answering the following specific question: Do the implementation problems
of non-Ricardian programs vanish in an infinite-horizon economy?
The answer to that question provided here is unambiguously negative. Using a stan-
dard model with money in the utility function, I first show that fiscalist divergent de-
flationary price-paths along which the private sector violates its solvency constraint are
irrational bubbles, since, regardless of the government’s fiscal plans it is never optimal for
the household to accumulate an infinite amount of real balances. Second, I argue that,
even when preferences allow for the possibility of a speculative hyperinflation, a fully
uncoordinated fiscal non-Ricardian plan, as those considered by Buiter, will generally
result in a negative price level. These are the two ways in which Buiter’s findings for a
finite-horizon economy emerge in the infinite counterpart. In this way, this work adds to
a better understanding of some of the fundamental obstacles of this relatively new theory
to offer a solid alternative to the traditional Ricardian-monetarist paradigm.
Also, I exploit the extreme case of a fiscalist hyperinflation to argue that the price-
determination mechanism stressed by FTPL cannot be supported by just assuming that
transversality conditions are equilibrium conditions (rather than identities) or by arguing
that the equilibrium value of money can be determined following the same arguments
traditionally employed in solving for the equilibrium value of a firm’s equity.
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